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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Canada*
In 1989 significant developments occurred in the competition law field, in the
validity of provincial restrictions against "national" law firms, as well as with
respect to the validity of exclusion of liability clauses in private contracts.
I. Private Remedies in Canadian Competition Law
In a unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed a challenge
to the constitutionality of section 31.1 of the Competition Act, 1986.1 Section
31.1 provides that "[a]ny person" who has suffered loss or damage as a result
of conduct in violation either of Part V (the criminal offense provisions) or of an
order of the Competition Tribunal (in respect of the reviewable matters in Part
VII) may recover damages from the person who engaged in such conduct. 2
Unlike the corresponding provision in the United States under which treble
damages are available, section 31.1 limits recoverable damages to the loss
actually suffered (plus costs).
The issue before the court in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National
Leasing3 was whether section 31.1 was within the legislative competence of the
Federal Government. Historically, federal anticombines legislation in Canada
had been upheld as a valid exercise of the federal power over criminal law. In
addition there had always been speculation that such provisions could also be
upheld under the federal "trade and commerce" power. Complicating the matter
is a long line of cases that have construed the provincial power over "property
and civil rights" very broadly. The regulation of particular industries (other than
*Prepared by D. J. Kee and J. Trossman.
1. Competition Act, Can. Stat. ch. 26, § 31.1(1986) [hereinafter section 31.1].
2. Id.
3. 1 S.C.R. 641 (1989); No. 19724.
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those expressly allocated to the Federal Government) has always been a matter
of exclusive provincial competence. Similarly, federally created civil causes of
action have been held to be unconstitutional where they intruded into areas of
exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held that the competition statute was a valid exercise of
both the criminal law power and the "general branch" of the federal trade and
commerce power. In so upholding the statute, the court noted that competition
laws, to be successful, must be national in scope. In practice, provincial
regulation of this aspect of the economy would mean no effective regulation.
Moreover, section 31.1 was viewed as an "integral part" of the statutory
scheme. Unlike the civil cause of action in the federal Trade Marks Act4 (struck
down as unconstitutional in 1976), section 31.1 was not merely "tacked on" to
the statute, but was functionally related to its general objective of deterring
anticompetitive behavior. The court referred to the American experience as
evidence of the effectiveness of private enforcement of competition laws.
The City National Leasing5 decision has important implications for the
constitutionality of the merger review provisions added in 1986, and currently is
being challenged in Alex Couture Inc. v. A. -G. Can.6 It would appear that it will
be difficult to establish that the merger review provisions are an unconstitutional
intrusion into provincial jurisdiction.
Now that the validity of section 31.1 is settled, it is likely that the provision
will be used more extensively. In addition, since section 31.1(2) provides that
evidence of a conviction under Part V is prima facie proof of the fact that the
relevant conduct was engaged in (for the purposes of section 31.1(1)), those
prosecuted for the commission of Part V offenses are likely to be considerably
more reluctant to plead guilty. A guilty plea will now carry with it a virtual
certainty of additional civil liability.
II. Exclusion of Liability Clauses
The Supreme Court of Canada has clarified the law regarding the enforceabil-
ity of clauses limiting or excluding liability in the event of a breach of contract.
The reasons of both Dickson C.J.C. (La Forest, J., concurring) and Wilson J.
(L'Heureux-Dube, J., concurring) in Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada
Ltd.7 would appear to have put to rest permanently the doctrine of "fundamental
breach" in Canada.
The original doctrine of fundamental breach was first propounded in English
jurisprudence by Lord Denning in the 1950s. Lord Denning's view was that,
whatever the clearly expressed intention of the parties to a contract might be, no
4. Trade Marks Act, Can. Stat. ch. T-10 (1970).
5. General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City Nat'l Leasing, I S.C.R. 641 (1989); No. 19724.
6. 16 Q.A.C. 161 (1988).
7. 1 S.C.R. 426 (1989); No. 19773, 19950.
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exclusion clause could ever relieve a party from liability where the breach was
"fundamental," i.e., such as to go to the "root" of the contract. This "rule of
law" approach was overruled by the House of Lords, once in the 1960s, and
subsequently in the 1980 decision in Photo Production v. Securicor Transport
Ltd.8 The House of Lords held that, while there was no rule of law such as Lord
Denning advocated, there was a rule of construction whereby very clear language
would be required before the court would conclude that an exclusion clause was
actually intended by the parties to operate in the event of a "fundamental"
breach.
One problem, even with the latter approach, was that it was difficult to predict
when a court might characterize a breach as "fundamental." Indeed, in Hunter
Engineering itself, different levels of courts disagreed on this question. Another
problem was that the doctrine diverted attention from consideration of what
Dickson, C.J.C., termed the real issue, i.e., whether the relevant clause was
" unconscionable."
Hunter Engineering involved a number of contracts for the supply of
gearboxes. In one of these contracts, the supplier had purported to exclude all
liability for consequential damages. The question was whether such a clause
could be relied upon. Dickson, C.J.C., held that parties should always be held
to the terms of their bargains unless the agreement is "unconscionable."
Unconscionability, moreover, requires some element of either "sharp practices"
or inequality of bargaining power. Thus, in the case at bar, as the parties were
both "large and commercially sophisticated companies," and there was no
evidence of any pressure, the term was to be enforced, without regard to whether
the breach could be characterized as "fundamental."
Wilson, J., took a slightly different approach, but concluded that "where there
is no inequality of bargaining power . . . the courts should as a general rule give
effect to the bargain freely negotiated by the parties."
The reasons in Hunter Engineering indicate a substantially reduced risk of
courts' striking down exclusion clauses. Where there is no evidence of "sharp
practices" or inequality of bargaining power, parties to a contract can now be
fairly confident that clauses excluding or limiting liability will be enforced by the
courts, even in situations where the breach goes to the "root" of the contract.
III. National Law Firms
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (Black v. Law Society of
Alberta),9 has opened the door to the establishment of "national" Canadian law
firms. Prior to this decision, law firms in Canada were prevented by provincial
8. 2 W.L.R. 283 (1980).
9. 1 S.C.R. 591 (1989); No. 19889.
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law society restrictions from forming partnerships that transcended provincial
boundaries.
The facts giving rise to the Black case are quite simple. The respondents
proposed to establish a Calgary law firm. Some partners of the firm were resident
in Toronto, but all lawyers in the firm were members of the Law Society of
Alberta. In addition, all members of the Calgary firm were to be members of a
Toronto firm. The Law Society of Alberta responded by enacting two rules. Rule
154 provided that members of the Alberta Law Society were prohibited from
entering into partnership with anyone who was not both a member of the Law
Society of Alberta and ordinarily resident in Alberta. Rule 75B prohibited
members of the Law Society from being partners in more than one firm.
The respondents argued that these rules violated the rights granted to citizens
and permanent residents of Canada in section 6(2)(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. 10 Section 6(2)(b) provides that such persons have the right
"to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.""I
La Forest, J., writing for a majority of the court, held that these rules were
indeed an infringement of the section 6(2)(b) right. The rules "severely
restricted" nonresidents of Alberta in the way in which they could practice law
in Alberta. While it was perfectly legitimate for a province or provincial law
society to insist that only members of the relevant law society be permitted to
practice law in the province, there was no legitimate justification for prohibiting
nonresident members from entering partnerships with resident members. Such a
prohibition, according to La Forest, J., effectively shut nonresident members out
of the practice of law in Alberta, since it prevented association with "the people
who would be their most valuable link to the Alberta legal community."
Nonresidents were thereby "seriously restricted" in their ability to gain a
livelihood in Alberta. The right granted by the plain words of section 6(2)(b) was
therefore infringed.
The court considered the possibility that, notwithstanding this violation of
section 6(2)(b), the rules could be upheld as a "reasonable limit" on this right
pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.' 2 On balance, however, the court held that
the restrictions imposed by rules 154 and 75B constituted a disproportionate
response to a number of the Law Society's concerns. The court dismissed
arguments that the quality of legal services delivered in Alberta might be
compromised, and that local competence and expertise might be diminished by
the existence of interprovincial law firms.
Since the decision in Black, a number of large legal partnerships in Canada
have established branch offices outside their home province. While provincial
law societies may impose distinctive admission requirements, the Black decision
10. Constitution Act of 1982, part 1, 116 Can. Gaz. 1808, part 11 (1982)[hereinafter Charter].
11. Id.
12. Id. §1.
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